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Exhibiting the Example:  Virginia Woolf ’s Shoes
John Nash
It would appear that Virginia Woolf had a thing about footwear. Shoes, 
slippers and boots, “old,” “shabby,” or lost, recur in her fiction and also 
make pointed appearances in her non-fiction. In To the Lighthouse (1927), 
a “pair of shoes” has been “shed and left” in the deserted holiday home 
of the Ramsays, still keeping “the human shape” which indicates “how 
once they were filled and animated” (194). In the late novel The Waves 
(1931), we find “the boot without laces stuck, black as iron, in the sand” 
(148). The posthumously-published Between the Acts (1941) has Giles Oli-
ver crush a choking snake, after which “The white canvas on his tennis 
shoes was bloodstained and sticky. But it was action. Action relieved him. 
He strode to the Barn, with blood on his shoes” (119). These images of 
unexplained loss and violent death bring out two of the more obvious 
associations that shoes carry in Woolf ’s writing. In this essay, I explore less 
what shoes stand for than how they stand; that is to say, my emphasis will 
not be on the interpretation of shoes as objects that carry the burden of 
something else (violence, loss, etc.) but on the ways in which shoes step 
forth in order to foreground the practice of exemplification. My focus 
is on Night and Day, Jacob’s Room and the essays and reviews of literary 
tourism (or literary geography, as she also called it). 
 In these works, Woolf often associates shoes with particular museo-
logical contexts so that they become for her a kind of shorthand by which 
she questions practices of exhibition and exemplification—issues that go 
to the heart of her career-long concern with modes of representation 
and perception. Shoes feature less as personal memorials (heavy with the 
weight of pathos) and more as figures in a narrative mode which fore-
grounds the selection, artifice, and experience of the exhibited example. 
This argument has four stages that correspond to sections of this essay. In 
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the first place, a conceptual framework of examples, things and memorial 
objects is drawn upon in order to clarify how Woolf ’s shoes function. 
While the ideas of Agamben, Brown, and others are discussed here, I draw 
on shoes not in order to exemplify their work but to chart some of the 
ways in which Woolf ’s writing was already, from its own perspective and 
with slightly different conclusions, asking similar questions. The second 
stage shows that Woolf ’s interest in shoes comes from her critical inter-
est in literary tourism, specifically in writers’ house museums. In Night 
and Day and in non-fictional responses to museological practices, she 
questioned the use of shoes as personal memorial objects. I argue that 
shoes should instead be seen as an example of the example, that is, as a 
reference to those house museums and as a questioning of metonymic 
exemplification. The third section then shows, in a close reading of Jacob’s 
Room, how she explored problems of selection, display, and classification. 
Jacob’s Cambridge room, and his shoes, are best read not as personal ob-
jects, or as symbols of loss, but as devices through which Woolf pursued 
her implicit critique of museological practice. This critique is brought out 
most strongly in the final section of the essay, which shows that Woolf 
consistently emphasized the role of the observer and the historical situa-
tion of the museum. These aspects of her approach can be seen through 
her use of the umbrella as an item of disruption and somatic experience. A 
symbol of repression and exclusion, the umbrella offers a counter-object 
to the shoe, for the umbrella may be said to be the object of the observer 
as the shoe is the object of the observed. 
 My argument, then, is that Woolf deploys the shoe as a code for the 
attempted exemplification of the subject practiced by house museums 
and literary tourism. Neither a metonym nor a “singularity” in Agamben’s 
sense, shoes are a way to highlight how those questions of representation, 
classification, and selection which underpin exemplification emphasize 
the artifice and arbitrariness of that practice. What I see as Woolf ’s his-
toricization of museum culture is furthered by the entry of the observer 
and her umbrella, by which she signals that the epistemological questions 
of exemplification occur within everyday lives.
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Exemplary things
Exemplification runs as a topic related to classification through philosophy 
from Aristotle to Kant and beyond. It might be said that the example both 
condenses and disperses signification: it may be an “example of,” in that it 
points to its classification or paradigm, but at the same time it steps away 
from its “class” or “rule” as an irreducible entity that has been singled out. 
It is thus both the privileged “exemplary” and ordinary “for example.” The 
oddity of its status has drawn discussion from thinkers such as Giorgio 
Agamben and Jacques Derrida. In Agamben’s reading of Aristotle, the 
example works by analogy and not by metaphor: it does not deploy a 
“transfer of meaning” (18) but retains its own significance. As Agamben 
develops the term, the example is a peculiarly radical category which 
“calls into question the dichotomous opposition between the particular 
and the universal which we are used to seeing as inseparable from the 
procedures of knowing, and presents instead a singularity irreducible to 
any of the dichotomy’s two terms”(19). Agamben thereby rewrites the 
Kuhnian (and Foucauldian) model in which a paradigm is created by a 
powerful example that allows the formulation of a new mode of inquiry 
by virtue of its repeatability and apparent explanatory capacity, and he 
replaces it with the idea of singularity. For Agamben, then, the work of 
exemplification is best not seen as a shuttle between example and rule 
but as a singular force, or being, by which the self-expression of the entity 
suspends its belonging to a general group: “it is never possible to separate 
its exemplarity from its singularity” (31). In these terms, exemplification 
is no longer an epistemological problem but an ontological one: “the 
paradigm has an ontological quality. It refers not to the cognitive rela-
tion between subject and object but to being” (32). One implication of 
Agamben’s account of the example is that it cannot be exemplified in its 
own terms; that is to say, any such attempt would initiate its own distinc-
tive retelling of the thesis. Another way to put this would be to say that 
examples form narratives: they are not merely explanatory, or creatively 
paradigmatic in Kuhn’s sense, but also carry a distinctiveness that propels 
narrative and opens it to multivocality.1 
 Recent work in thing theory would appear to be indebted to Agam-
ben’s approach to the question of the example. In Bill Brown’s terms, 
there is something “thingly” about this notion of the example. In Brown’s 
well-known distinction, objects are those items which we know and use, 
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whose functionality is unproblematic and which, existing in a stable 
relationship with their owners or users, can be placed and read (offer-
ing epistemological security); whereas things, on the other hand, are not 
constrained by subjective belonging, and outperform their functionality 
in arresting and unusual ways. If objects are representative, for instance 
in denoting their class of items, or in embodying cultural values, or in 
belonging to a subjective appropriation, they might be thought of as 
something like conventional metonymic examples (an examples of their 
class). The thing’s oddity, on the other hand, is also its singularity: it is 
non-representative and finally irreducible to subjective appropriation. In 
sidestepping the subject-object relationship and emphasizing materiality, 
the uncontrolled thing speaks as a singular example in the manner of 
Agamben’s analysis. 
 It might appear question-begging to exemplify this, but Brown has 
provided numerous examples. It is especially apposite that Brown illus-
trated the distinction between “thing” and “object” by comparing Woolf ’s 
short story “Solid Objects” with Jacob’s Room. In his analysis, “Solid 
Objects” “insists on” displaying thingness, by “liberating” artefacts away 
from “their status as determinate signs” and “rendering a life of things 
that is irreducible to the history of human subjects.” The broken glass 
that forms the protagonist’s collection is “nothing but glass.”2 With Jacob’s 
Room, by contrast, its “pathos . . . depends precisely on that reduction 
[of material object to human subject], on the symbolic and metonymic 
power of objects” (12) and Brown therefore implies that this novel is ef-
fective insofar as it establishes an association of objects with their subject 
or owner. Brown’s use of the term “pathos” to describe what he calls the 
“metonymic power of objects” in Jacob’s Room appears to refer to the fi-
nal image of Jacob’s shoes which remain after his presumed death at war: 
“‘What am I to do with these, Mr Bonamy?’ She held out a pair of Jacob’s 
old shoes” (247). 
 Brown’s analysis is in keeping with a long critical history in Woolf 
studies which emphasizes metonymy and pathos in the closing scene. Alex 
Zwerdling repeats an old story: “The significance of the scene is clarified 
by an anecdote about Woolf recalled by one of her friends: ‘….When 
Leonard went away, she said, she didn’t miss him at all. Then suddenly 
she caught sight of a pair of his empty shoes, which had kept the posi-
tion and shape of his feet—and was ready to dissolve into tears instantly’” 
(911). Although readers may doubt that this anecdote “clarifies” those 
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final lines of the novel, many have continued to view Jacob’s shoes met-
onymically. Although for Laura Marcus, the anecdote implies “too neat a 
‘fit’ between the shoes and their owner” yet “the synecdochical nature of 
the shoes—they ‘stand in’ for the absent Jacob—is again appropriate in a 
novel in which ‘character’ has been represented in flashes and fragments” 
(93). For Robert Reginio, the shoes are a personal monument (unlike the 
public memorial of the cenotaph), which again operates by synecdoche: 
“Jacob’s shoes stand metonymically for Jacob as a fragment” (93).3 This is 
in keeping with the association made by many readers between Jacob and 
his inanimate possessions, a critical convention, echoed by Brown, that 
relies upon the shoes as metonyms—put simply, they stand in for Jacob 
in an exemplary way, figuring his absent body and its death. Brown had 
even held up Jacob’s Room as a good example: unlike the “unrepresenta-
tive fragment” (13) that is “Solid Objects,” the novel should be seen as 
“representative” of Woolf ’s writing precisely because of this apparent 
metonymy between shoe and owner. Indeed, what Brown sees as differ-
ing perspectives within her writing make Woolf herself a good example 
with which to illustrate his thing/object distinction. 
 In the analysis that follows, I argue against this critical consensus 
(which Brown apparently endorses): the shoes in Jacob’s Room are not 
metonyms or objects. Nor do I want to read Woolf ’s shoes as if they could 
themselves exemplify Brown’s things or Agamben’s singularity. My inter-
est, then, is not in the indelible thingness of Woolf ’s depictions of shoes, 
if they have any, or in their stated materiality (the canvas, or rubber, or 
leather of actual shoes), and nor is it finally in their symbolic objectness 
(of loss, etc.). Instead, this essay asks why shoes came to seem so important 
to Woolf and finds the answer in her critique of literary tourism. She was 
drawn to shoes, through encountering them in museological contexts, 
noting the representative load they carry, but she was also struck by the 
way in which they held out an apparent singularity and wonder. While 
shoes may on occasion appear to be singular, and therefore perhaps ver-
sions of Agamben’s notion of the example, Woolf ’s interest goes further 
than this, for by invoking the museum context she historicizes the con-
struction of exemplarity and places it within a tactile as well epistemologi-
cal frame. 
 Shoes are an interesting and complex case because of the ways in 
which they straddle the subject/object divide, a quality exacerbated by 
the way that, in Woolf and in certain aspects of museum culture more 
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generally, they became associated with death.4 It is worth noting that the 
identification entailed by pathos may be indicated by shoes and clothing 
in particular, as Woolf ’s tears for the absent Leonard perhaps indicate. 
Psychologists agree that such objects can become prosthetic: as “their soles 
take on the marks of the owner’s gait” they may become “singularized, 
bearing the stamp of individuality and everyday experience” (Lupton 
144). Although usually objects of mass production, shoes, and other items, 
carry the specificity of the owner-wearer even to the extent of making 
them so shaped to an individual that they cannot with ease be worn by 
another. They can thus become “appropriated objects”—commodities 
which, anthropologists like Daniel Miller suggest, have been transformed 
through personal use and transmuted through “that process of objectifica-
tion by which we create ourselves” into personalized objects of “poten-
tially inalienable culture” (215) that are constitutive of subjectivity. Such 
shoes would become especially endowed with pathos in death. Studies 
of death suggest that shoes may indeed be exemplary and pathetic: “The 
transformative power that death has upon lived material environments 
can also render the most familiar objects strange or disturbing by degrees. 
What was once a well-worn, comfortable pair of shoes might become, 
after the death of their owner, the most powerful register of loss” (Hallam 
43). While these interpretations of our emotional capacity to identify with 
a pair of shoes may go some way to explaining critics’ reactions to the 
ending of Jacob’s Room, Woolf was well aware that memorial shoes need 
not be pathetic. 
 Re-reading Robinson Crusoe at the beginning of 1926, Woolf noted 
that an image of empty shoes invoked the death of Crusoe’s shipmates. 
She comments: “A sense of desolation and of the deaths of many men 
is conveyed by remarking in the most prosaic way in the world, ‘I never 
saw them afterwards, or any sign of them except three of their hats, one 
cap, and two shoes that were not fellows’” (381). Woolf draws attention to 
the disparity between the casualness of the narration (“the most prosaic 
way in the world”) and the import of the image. Indeed, it would be 
this peculiar elegiac bathos—rather than the pathos found by Brown and 
others—that Woolf would exploit so successfully (as in the famous paren-
thetical death in To the Lighthouse). Indeed, the image of the dead sailors’ 
shoes illustrated a mode of novel-writing which her reading notes refer to 
as “particularity”: “Every thing fitted in no looseness. This is one kind of 
reality” she entered in her reading notebook (Silver 21).5 It was precisely 
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Defoe’s aversion to pathos that impressed Woolf. This is not to say that 
Woolf merely followed Defoe’s path but to point to her recognition that 
memorial shoes are only objects of pathos from a certain novelistic, or 
curatorial, perspective and that from another perspective they may form 
a quite different approach. As the following section argues, Woolf was 
fascinated with shoes precisely because they are exhibited and found in 
museological and memorial contexts which, one can argue, question our 
reading of their pathos. That is not to deny that she too associates them 
with death, and laments the passing of their wearers, but to suggest that 
the practices by which objects are sometimes made to stand as representa-
tive examples entailed what was to Woolf a questionable epistemology.
Writers’ home museums
The primary setting of Woolf ’s second novel, Night and Day (1919), is 
the home of the daughter and granddaughter of “the great poet, Richard 
Alardyce” (9). Part of the home is dedicated to preserving his writerly 
things, among which an “original manuscript” (10) sits on the table. Par-
ticular attention is then drawn to “a pair of large, worn slippers, one of 
which Katharine picked up.” Why are the slippers significant? Why are 
they there, and why does Katharine pick one up? By the time she wrote 
this, writers’ footwear was familiar to Woolf, perhaps too familiar, as em-
blems commonly displayed within writers’ house museums. The rise of 
the house museum, and Woolf ’s non-fictional accounts of literary tour-
ism, provide a necessary context to Night and Day, and indeed, to Woolf ’s 
depictions of shoes in general.
 In early twentieth-century London, writers’ house museums were a 
recently established institution. They set out both to preserve important 
physical aspects of English heritage, in common with the blue plaque 
scheme, and to cater to public interest in literary celebrity. The labelling 
of significant homes became an important step in the longer traditions of 
literary tourism and it had an influential role as part of the burgeoning 
conservation movement, pre-dating both the Ancient Monuments Pro-
tection Act (1882) and the National Trust (founded 1895). Commemora-
tive plaques on houses began in London in 1867 with Byron’s house in 
Cavendish Square and became especially popular in the early twentieth 
century (a standardized blue design began in 1903 and has been adopted, 
with modifications, since then; today, eight properties associated with 
8John Nash
Woolf bear a blue plaque). Woolf ’s visits to the recently opened house 
museums, and her records of those visits, suggest a context through which 
she initially encountered memorial and exemplary shoes. This context 
then informed her creation of museum spaces and exhibited shoes in 
Night and Day and Jacob’s Room.
 Several writers’ houses opened as museums to the public in the pe-
riod when Woolf was setting out on and consolidating her career. Her 
father, Sir Leslie Stephen, launched the Carlyle Memorial Fund in honor 
of his friend, purchasing his Cheyne Row house and opening it as the 
Carlyle Museum in 1895. In 1911, Samuel Johnson’s house was bought 
and restored by Cecil Harmsworth, a Liberal MP, who also built a Cura-
tor’s Cottage next door. A Memorial Committee was formed in 1920 to 
purchase the Keats/Brown house and “Keats House” opened to the public 
five years later. The Dickens Fellowship had long possessed his house at 48 
Doughty Street; it also opened as a Museum in 1925. Woolf ’s visits to the 
Carlyle House, the Brontë Museum in Haworth, and other writers’ house 
museums, spanned her adult life from the late nineteenth century to the 
1930s. These journeys, together with the essays and reviews they directly 
led to—including “Haworth, November, 1904,” “Carlyle’s House,” “Liter-
ary Geography,” “Flumina Amem Silvasqu” and “Great Men’s Houses”—
underpin and reinforce her deep interest in the relationship between the 
writer and the place of composition, which is most famously explored in 
A Room of One’s Own but seems an almost constant preoccupation. 
 In her ground-breaking study of modernist writers’ engagement with 
the heritage industry, Andrea Zemgulys suggests that literary heritage cre-
ated “a narrow logic of place and expression . . . of setting and meaning” 
(“Night” 73) but that idea was also more widely promulgated. The no-
tion that a notable person’s house is worth preserving owed much to the 
Victorian domestic movement (Henry Cole, a self-proclaimed judge of 
domestic taste and the founder of the South Kensington Museum—later 
the V & A—was one of the founders of the blue plaque scheme), just as 
it did to the many late-Victorian domestic magazines, such as Hearth and 
Home, and advisors like Jane Panton and Rosamund Marriott Watson, 
who popularized the idea that homes are expressive of the people who 
inhabit and furnish them. The creation of “At Home” profiles in domes-
tic magazines in the late-nineteenth century further cemented the idea 
that houses expressed their inhabitants. Indeed, writers’ homes were a 
particular favorite of the “At Home” profile. The museums that began to 
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be created in writers’ homes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries were a further development of the same principle. Spurred on 
by the success of these profiles, they apparently enabled open access to 
the intimate and supposedly revealing environment of the famous writer.6 
While Zemgulys acknowledges that Woolf ’s “homage” to the dead writer 
and his house was also “critical,” she accepts its presumption of the ex-
pressivity of environment. House museums are said to “afford Woolf a 
deeper knowledge of the beloved author who shapes his house in his 
image” (“Night” 73). As we will see, Woolf challenged the presumption 
of representative exemplarity that this suggests. 
 Zemgulys claims that Woolf “approves of literary geography gener-
ally” (that is, of the critical study of writers in their environments) and 
“tacitly approves of . . . literary tourism” (Modernism 163) but she was 
deeply sceptical of the practice. A deep unease with literary tourism and 
the apparent assumptions of house museums runs through Woolf ’s es-
says and reviews on the subject. She suggests setting “an examination . . 
. in place of entrance fee” at the Carlyle Museum—but that “the house 
would soon have to be shut up” (“Haworth” 5). Yet this unease is always 
tempered by curiosity. For one thing, she kept going to these museums, 
making several visits to 5 Cheyne Row (where she had the greatest per-
sonal connection). A notebook written in 1909 and “discovered” a decade 
ago contains Woolf ’s impressions of her third visit, undertaken in part as 
research for her review of The Love Letters of Thomas and Jane Carlyle for 
the TLS. Her conclusion on that volume—“the more we see the less 
we can label” (257)—seems especially apt also for her impression of the 
museum. Woolf ’s notebook confirms her suspicions of the enterprise: 
“Carlyle’s house already has the look of something forcibly preserved” 
(Carlyle 3). (In her earlier essay on the Brontë parsonage at Haworth she 
had argued “it is better to read Carlyle in your own study than to visit 
the sound-proof room” [5].)
 When Woolf writes at the beginning of “Haworth, November, 1904” 
that “I do not know whether pilgrimages to the shrines of famous men 
ought not to be condemned as sentimental journeys” (5), the double 
negative suggests a particular reluctance to say outright what offends 
her. This double-edged critical attitude runs through Woolf ’s writing 
on writers’ houses and their personal effects. It might be traced back 
to the dichotomy of standards of taste that the house museums catered 
to, as both official establishments of the state’s cultural heritage industry 
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and a populist opening of doors. Woolf is clearly uneasy with both these 
aspects: the museum’s role in the creation of a tradition of “great men” 
and its sometimes facile engagement with their writing. In another early 
review-essay, “Literary Geography” (1905), she clearly distrusts both the 
sentimental fetishizing of objects and spaces (“the fact that Thackeray rang 
this very doorbell”[32]) as well as the mundane logging of addresses to 
trace any “influence” that may be ascribed to “surroundings.” Yet at the 
same time, her first-person narrative shows the author viewing herself 
as both kinds of tourist: “We are either pilgrims from sentiment . . . or 
we are scientific in our pilgrimage.” It is a subject to which she is often 
drawn. “We cannot get past a great writer’s house without pausing to give 
an extra look into it and furnishing it as far as we are able with his cat 
and his dog, his books and his writing table,” she admitted in “Flumina 
Amem Silvasque,” a 1917 review of Edward Thomas’s A Literary Pilgrim 
in England. Having admitted here, at her most enthusiastic and critically 
self-aware point, that this kind of tourism has “some true pleasure and 
profit” she yet adds immediately that she steps “rather stealthily perhaps . 
. . lest the ghosts of the dead should awaken us” (161). As both an actual 
visitor, and as a reader of works in the Pilgrimage series and other more 
“trashy books” of literary tourism (Letters 178), Woolf never shook off her 
discomfort—an unease that was both intellectual and social. 7
 Woolf ’s disquiet with house museums may be seen in her references 
to shoes. Shoes initially took on a “wondrous” significance for Woolf in 
her first article on literary tourism (she had earlier visited the Carlyle 
house at least twice), in which she records her visit to the Brontë museum 
in late 1904.8 
The museum is certainly rather a pallid and inanimate collec-
tion of objects. An effort ought to be made to keep things out 
of these mausoleums, but the choice often lies between them 
and destruction, so that we must be grateful for the care that 
has preserved much. . . .Here are many autograph letters, pencil 
drawings, and other documents. But the most touching case—so 
touching that one hardly feels reverent in one’s gaze—is that 
which contains the little personal relics, the dresses and shoes 
of the dead woman. The natural fate of such things is to die 
before the body that wore them, and because these, trifling and 
transient though they are, have survived, Charlotte Brontë the 
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woman comes to life, and one forgets the chiefly memorable fact 
that she was a great writer. Her shoes and her thin muslin dress 
have outlived her.      (“Haworth” 7)
The dry museum context provides the necessary boredom and banality in 
which the shoes and dress may shine.9 These shoes give a “thrill” because 
the surprising longevity of the object renders the owner a fragile subject. 
Amid “letters . . . drawings, and other documents” (as may well be found 
on any desk), these shoes appear to have their own specificity. Woolf ’s 
interest in shoes comes, then, not only from their context but from their 
specific role within the museum, as apparent bearers of personal testimony, 
where they seem to act both as exemplary of the individual writer and 
as singular things, shining forth from the banality of the setting. While it 
may be tempting to sense here the aura of the art-object—“Charlotte’s 
shoes become sacred relics or Cinderella’s slippers” comments Alison 
Booth (107)—Woolf ’s wider point is surely the more important. That is, 
that the museum space has constructed both a version of the Brontës (a 
version that it cannot finally contain) which is more in line with museum 
practice than with its subject, by promoting a form of viewing experience 
based on the reverential preservation of the past and the code of silent 
observation.
 In a later essay, from 1917, Woolf goes on to consider the possibility 
that the shoes of writers in particular hold an “immensely personal” sway 
over us that others’ shoes do not. The aura of writers is such that “even 
their old shoes have a way of being worn on this side rather than on that, 
which seems not gossip but revelation” (“Flumina” 161). It might appear 
from this remark that Woolf does indeed privilege the memorial shoe as 
a conduit to the private man; there is a hint of singular exemplarity in 
the special “revelation” of the shows of the writer that goes beyond the 
mere “gossip” of incidental detail. However, the immediate context of that 
sentence implies a different interpretation. The following sentence reads: 
“We speak of writers; the military or medical or legal pilgrim may exist, 
but we fancy that the present of his heroes’ old boots would show him 
nothing but leather” (161). Woolf does not, then, evoke footwear in itself 
as the personal object of embodiment (or as “revelation”) but instead ac-
knowledges its arbitrariness in her comparison of different character-types, 
juxtaposing the writer’s shoes with the soldier’s (or doctor’s or lawyer’s) 
boots, which are mere leather. As much as Woolf could be attracted to the 
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intimation of the personal, she seems always to want to contextualize it.
 The repeated return to the context of the museum seems to stem 
from a fundamental unease with a simplistic deductive, Holmesian inter-
pretation of domestic space promoted by “At Home” profiles and some 
literary tourism. In “Small Talk about Meredith,” an essay published in 
1919 at the time of writing Night and Day, Woolf argues that it is seldom 
desirable to know personal details of writers’ lives. “We do not often find 
ourselves in the position of listeners at keyholes,” she writes. But “if Mer-
edith were to open the door he would find us for the most part devoutly 
examining the boots and umbrellas in the hall. Our deductions from 
these objects would probably provide him with some merriment” (5). 
Woolf is explicit: she criticizes the use of this “evidence” in “interpreting 
Meredith’s character.” Footwear can therefore be seen as Woolf ’s means of 
foregrounding how literary tourism employed metonymic exemplarity in 
service of a reductive materialism. As a recurrent figure of the novelistic 
problem of how to read personal effects, the image of shoes becomes not 
so much an example in itself as an example of the example, consistently 
invoking a distrusted museum context.
 Woolf ’s privileging of the museological context over the lustre of 
the shoes can be seen by returning briefly to Night and Day. In her role 
of guide, Katharine Hilbery shows to visitors her family’s “little room . . 
. crowded with [ancestors’] relics” (9). Her speech is a “catalogue” (11), 
“for the thousandth time” recited “as if she knew what she had to say by 
heart” (10). This room is clearly based on house museums; as Zemgulys 
observes, its location in Cheyne Walk would place it just around the cor-
ner from the actual Carlyle museum (Modernism 179). The centrepiece 
of the family shrine is dedicated, with “special illumination” (9) to her 
grandfather-poet and contains a picture of him above his writing desk on 
which sits a pen, spectacles, and a manuscript of one of his poems. Despite 
these intimations of the work of writing, particular attention is drawn by 
the narrator and by the curatorial Katharine, to the poet’s slippers: “be-
neath the table was a pair of large, worn slippers, one of which Katharine 
picked up” (10) and she comments to Ralph Denham, her visitor and 
eventual lover, in an apparently jocular, off-handed and familiar way, on 
her grandfather’s considerable size. Not only has footwear again become 
the apparent example of the dead subject (it tells us his size, it appears to 
offer us a personal image), it has been carefully selected and exhibited 
in the home museum to offset the more formal or professional items on 
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display. Interestingly, the slipper is picked out as the only item Katharine 
explicitly handles, rather like the shoes “held out” by Mrs Flanders (Jacob 
247), and unlike the untouched shoes under glass in the Brontë Museum. 
 It is clear, however, that these slippers have been carefully placed 
within a system of exemplification, within which they are then fore-
grounded to display their role as personal artefact. But this form of ex-
hibited exemplification was so familiar to Woolf that her fictional shoes 
come to seem almost a cliché rather than a “wondrous” thing. This is the 
crucial, one might say structural, point of the example—that it is not in-
herently expressive in and of itself but instead illustrates the assumptions 
of its context. Shoes are therefore not things that display only their own 
materiality, in Brown’s sense, and nor do they quite emit the singular 
wonder of exemplarity in Agamben’s sense; instead Woolf places these 
epistemological questions within a quite specific historical and literary 
context.
 In placing Katharine in this opening scene as a naïve attendant to the 
“relics” (9) of “those giant men” (10), Woolf has transferred her earlier ex-
ploration of memorial footwear into her fiction in order to say what she 
is more ambivalent about in her non-fiction: that literary tourism, with 
its new institution of the house museum, is a sham. This attitude is made 
clear in a later scene in “the little inner room” (332) of the family shrine. 
Katharine performs “her duties as show-woman” (333), pausing between 
items “for the right number of seconds” (332). But jadedness and disaffec-
tion now define Katharine’s relationship with the great men of the past; 
this time it is the visitor, an “American lady who had come to be shown 
the relics” (331), who singles out the slippers. “‘What! His very own 
slippers!’ Laying aside the manuscript, she hastily grasped the old shoes, 
and remained for a moment dumb in contemplation of them” (333). 
The writers’ shoes have become the focus of a satire on the “sentimental 
journeys” (“Howarth” 5) of the literary tourist’s “dumb” admiration and 
despoiling “grasp.” This scene might also be read as a self-referential display 
that mediates between two characteristic tones of Woolf ’s writing: the 
satirical dismissal of the uncultured, and the paternal anxiety awakened by 
autobiography—how can Woolf throw off her own “great men” without 
being uncultured? The “foolish” American tourist is said to be a “victim” 
of Katharine’s ill humor, while Katharine, for whom “the ceremony of 
ancestor-worship had been more than usually oppressive” (335), is her-
self alienated from her personal and familial relations as a direct result of 
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the exhibition of these things. Both curator and visitor are estranged, in 
their different ways, by the experience of the museum. In this way, Woolf 
manages to be self-aware in the display of her own condescension just as 
she stages her own familial anxiety. Reading this novel alongside the non-
fiction on literary tourism reveals that, for Woolf, footwear has become 
self-reflexive: it stands as an example of the museological example, as a 
display of the exhibition. 
The example in Jacob’s Room
Museological problems of space, selection and classification were also 
ordinary, homely issues. That the private house was already a sort of 
museum, in which the collecting and self-improvement of the Victorian 
public institution had been enjoined at home, was well known to Woolf, 
whose own domestic spaces ranged from the library of Leslie Stephen to 
the murals of Vanessa Bell and Duncan Grant. Douglas Mao has linked 
Woolf ’s not untypical childhood collecting of insects to the standard 
Victorian advice of C. A. Montressor that “every house ought to possess 
a ‘Museum’” (30). What Mao calls the “systematizing Victorian paternal 
imperative” of collecting and classifying is reworked in Jacob’s Room in 
particular, in which Woolf can be seen tracing the problems of museologi-
cal arrangements as they prescribe forms of knowing. 
 In 1905, after the British Museum had announced the building of its 
new newspaper library at Colindale to take pressure off the main reading 
room and its stores, Woolf explicitly linked the museum to the home:
We have read of the over-burdened British Museum—how even 
its appetite for printed matter flags, and the monster pleads that it 
can swallow no more. This public crisis has long been familiar in 
private houses. One member of the household is almost officially 
deputed to stand at the hall door with flaming sword and do 
battle with the invading armies. Tracts, pamphlets, advertisements, 
gratuitous copies of magazines, and the literary productions of 
friends come by post, by van, by messenger.     (“Decay” 24)
The problem of space, already well-known to the curators and librarians 
of the British Museum, would only be exacerbated by the Copyright 
Act of 1911 which created copyright libraries with entitlement to any 
book printed in Great Britain.10 The home museum similarly faced the 
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dual problem that the collection would never be completed, and that 
physical space would be exhausted. In Night and Day, the acquisition of a 
new proof-sheet of the great poet’s threatens to disrupt the order of the 
display: “But was there room for it? Must it be hung on the staircase, or 
should some other relic give place to do it honour?” (335). The necessity 
of selection underlines that the choice of examples is “never innocent” 
(Miller 11) and their order implies a teleology.
 The ordering of items, the necessity of choice, and therefore also the 
necessary implication of an active curator, are issues that Woolf explores 
more fully in Jacob’s Room. In the description of Jacob’s Cambridge room, 
the un-named and generally unobtrusive narrator guides readers from 
object to object, encountering Jacob’s “incredibly shabby” slippers along 
the way. The account offers an intriguing mix of classified order and sub-
jective impression. 
Jacob’s room had a round table and two low chairs. There were 
yellow flags in a jar on the mantelpiece; a photograph of his 
mother; cards form societies with little raised crescents; coats of 
arms, and initials; notes and pipes; on the table lay paper ruled 
with a red margin—an essay, no doubt—“Does History consist of 
the Biographies of Great Men?” There were books enough; very 
few French books, but then anyone who’s worth anything reads 
just what he likes, as the mood takes him, with extravagant en-
thusiasm. Lives of the Duke of Wellington, for example; Spinoza; 
the works of Dickens; the Faery Queen; a Greek dictionary with 
the petals of poppies pressed to silk between the pages; all the 
Elizabethans. His slippers were incredibly shabby, like boats burnt 
to the water’s rim. Then there were photographs from the Greeks, 
and a mezzotint from Sir Joshua—all very English. The works of 
Jane Austen too, in deference, perhaps, to someone else’s standard. 
Carlyle was a prize. There were books on the Italian painters of 
the Renaissance, a Manual of the Diseases of the Horse, and all the 
usual textbooks. Listless is the air in an empty room, just swelling 
the curtain; the flowers in the jar shift. One fibre in the wicker 
armchair creaks, though no one sits there.     (48-49)
Several critics have listed off the items in this room as indisputably Jacob’s 
and remain committed to an explanatory decoding of these objects as 
exemplary of Jacob’s character.11 Even for those who rightly question the 
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mimetic principles of the room’s composition—for whom its things do 
not take us closer to Jacob but “take him further away” (Kazan 710)—the 
scene remains centered on Jacob: it still signals his absence and the impos-
sibility of finally attaining the subject.12 Yet Woolf ’s revisions are indicative 
of the subtle movement in this passage towards cutting a subject-object 
connection that it otherwise appears to play upon. She had initially 
written “Jacob’s room is like most undergraduate rooms” (Holograph 37). 
By cutting the phrase, she has displaced the room from the pressure of 
typicality, and in her final description Woolf moves away from the “symp-
tomatic” indication of character via objects in order to move towards her 
broader questioning of the arbitrariness of commemorative forms.
 “The room is presented” Kazan observes, “through naming, listing, 
classifying, rather than describing” (710), but its point is also to question 
the presumptions of such formal divisions. The room appears initially in 
the shape of a sequential list (or list of sub-lists): first the furniture, then 
the mantelpiece, then the books; but the categorizing principle soon 
breaks down into individual items and repetition. The sub-list of books—
as with the list of things in the room as a whole—veers between an ap-
parent clarity and an opaque oddity: why the trouble of recognizing the 
specific sort of biography it is, or the use to which the Greek dictionary 
has been put, if one is merely going to note more casually and vaguely 
“Spinoza” or “all the Elizabethans”? 
 Intriguingly, the classifying impulse breaks down where the narrative 
voice encounters Jacob’s slippers: the mini-lists of furniture, mantelpiece 
items and books are cut off by the slippers. To some extent, the slippers 
stand out: they give rise to the only figurative image in the passage (“like 
boats burnt to the water’s rim”); they receive the only adverbial inten-
sification (“incredibly”—a word perhaps to test our credulity); and they 
are the only things in the room which are described as “His”—all the 
others have no possessive pronoun. The room reads like an encounter 
with a house museum: empty of life, its arbitrary objects made to bear 
an expectation they cannot fulfil, all enclosed within the stale order of 
preservation. (No wonder Carlyle is here.) But what of the slippers—are 
these “revelation”? Do they have “a way of being worn on this side rather 
than that” (“Flumina” 161) which is the trace of their aura? These slippers 
arrest neither us nor our guide who returns to wall pictures and more 
books. The moment is not one of “revelation” but one that again contex-
tualizes the shoes within the museological, calling attention to their age 
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and wear, for sure, but also to their setting, a collection from which they 
have not escaped. The shoes remain within the curator’s frame, encased 
by the respectful distance of “There were” (repeated four times). Woolf ’s 
revisions to this passage show that she took care to imply, without show-
ing, the narrator’s partially-embodied characterization. She eliminated 
all three first-person references by the narrator, and by also changing the 
only direct second-person address to readers (“you know how anyone 
reads who’s worth anything, just what he likes” became “anyone who’s 
worth anything reads just what he likes”) she created a more impersonal 
tone. The narrative voice is both cataloguing and intruding, like a curator 
who cannot fully extricate herself from the exhibition; her repression can 
be felt behind the glassy manner (Holograph 37-38).
 The Cambridge room explicitly makes exemplification its central 
concern. Consider that curious “For example” in the middle of the 
passage. This oddly suggestive but uncertain phrase is indicative of the 
room-list as a kind of disorganized taxonomy. The phrase seems to carry 
four possible significances. One reading is that the phrase may refer to all 
the books as examples of what one might read “as the mood takes him.” 
In this case, these books are not necessarily in the room at all and are 
merely suggested by the narrative voice. The second possibility is that “for 
example” refers to those “books enough” on or by the table, and these are 
examples of some of them. In the third reading, “for example” again refers 
to the books which were there but in this case the list of books is exhaus-
tive and “for example” refers specifically to the biographies of Wellington 
(the phrase is grammatically sectioned off with “Lives of the Duke of 
Wellington”). In this reading, the list merely begins, seemingly at random, 
with this example and appears to be a list in no particular order and with 
no principle of coherence other than that these books (apparently) were 
there. The fourth reading of “for example”—and this applies whether the 
books are there or not—posits Wellington himself as the example. In this 
version, the narrator supposes that there were “Lives” in this room (per-
haps the only kind of life), in accordance with the imagined title of the 
possible essay (“Does History consist of the biographies of Great Men?”). 
In this variant, the narrator promises that there were biographies of some 
kind, just as we are promised that the paper on the table comprises an 
essay. Here, Wellington is the apt example of the Great Man in History. 
This “for example” promises the example as model, an exemplary figure, 
someone “Great.” Fittingly, then, the phrase “for example” has called at-
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tention to the artifice of the scene and the failure of rooms such as this 
to exemplify their inhabitants. As Woolf remarked of those who viewed 
Jane Carlyle’s pictures: “did they think that her house and her had been 
like that?” (Carlyle 3).
 Jacob’s room is therefore a play on exemplarity and an exercise in 
classification—more coded exhibition than personal insight. There is no 
“revelation” to be made here. In her discussion of some of Woolf ’s things, 
Rachel Bowlby has discussed a list written by Lady Fry (which Woolf re-
produces in her biographical study of Roger Fry [17]). The list is divided 
into two classifications, “Things that were not—: Things that were: when 
I was a little child.” Lady Fry’s list runs incongruous items side-by-side: 
“hoardings with posters; Japanese anemones; spring mattresses” were not; 
“tippets and sleeves (in one); snuff-boxes and Chartists” were. The move-
ment between items seems to be based on little or no principle of order. 
As Bowlby puts it, Lady Fry’s “eccentricity in not observing the rules of 
different orders of ‘things’ serves to show up the more pervasive eccentric-
ity of ‘common-sense’ classifications in their necessary arbitrariness” (121). 
Woolf ’s sub-lists of the Cambridge room may suggest that a necessary 
fiction of order has been created with its own exemplary specimens. In 
this sense, Woolf would seem to be echoing the Kuhnian definition of 
paradigms: these exemplary things have created the classification and the 
model, i.e. we see the room as a whole in its arrangement of distinct parts 
(books, furniture, etc.) because of the exemplarity noticed by the narrator. 
Indeed, the novel is premised on the impossibility of escaping systems of 
classification just as it shows them to be delusional, if necessary, models 
of knowledge. So Woolf carefully constructs the narrator’s quest for Jacob 
as a vain search for a unique object: although Jacob may be associated 
with the word “distinction” (94), the narrator is always aware that such 
distinction is created through a series of types, characters and classifica-
tion. “But surely, of all futile occupations this of cataloguing features is 
the worst,” she says. The sense prevails of a necessary, if fictional, form of 
order. Remarking on the theatre’s division of audience into “stalls, boxes, 
amphitheatre, gallery,” the narrator states the necessity of the “system of 
classification” that exists “to prevent us from being submerged by chaos” 
(91). Such “simplicity” is required, she suggests, but it does not overcome 
the problem of selection and exemplification: “the difficulty remains—one 
has to choose.” While the epistemological problems of the museum reside 
in this necessarily arbitrary creation of order, Woolf shows that it is also 
an everyday, homely, and personal pursuit as well. 
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 The remarkable shift in tense within the description of Jacob’s 
room underscores the root problem of the inability of classification to 
be final or definite. The presentation of this scene has an unaccountable 
dual split—between simple past and present tenses, as between definite 
and indefinite articles: “Jacob’s room had . . . ” and “Listless is the air in 
an empty room.” This is itself a narrative encapsulation of the problem 
thrown up by the order of things—the problem being not only its artifice 
but also its very presumption of being. As Frances Ferguson remarks in her 
re-reading of Foucault, the radical complexity of the order of things is not 
just the arbitrariness of classification but also the fundamental question 
of what it is, or what appears to be, possible to classify: all orders of things 
have already decided on the fundamental question of what is and can be 
ordered (311-12). But in foregrounding its doubt in exemplification, and 
in its final shift of tense of the “textual ghost” (Trotter 94), Woolf ’s nar-
rative of the room destroys ontological security. What, and who, exists in 
the room remains uncertain. Jacob’s room, and Woolf ’s footwear generally, 
render permeable that distinction between “what is” and “what is not” (as 
in Lady Fry’s list). Shoes in Woolf, then, point less towards a subject than 
they do towards problems of classification and selection. But if this seems 
a peculiarly abstract rendering of objects, the final point of this argument 
shows that Woolf ’s display of exemplification always involves a grounded, 
indeed historicized, perspective.
The experience of the umbrella
I have argued that Woolf used shoes with which to foreground questions 
of exemplification as a museological and novelistic practice, deriving her 
impetus from house museums and literary tourism. But her response to 
museums crucially goes further than this. In highlighting the role of shoes 
in these early essays and fictions, Woolf can also be seen drawing atten-
tion to the historicity of the object, pointing out the role of the observer 
and the history and context of museum preservation. In her numerous 
essays on literary tourism and in Night and Day and Jacob’s Room, she care-
fully locates the roles of both curator and observer as physical, intrusive 
presences. The somatic experience of the museum—carefully regulated 
in Jacob’s Cambridge room as also by Katherine Hilbery—takes on 
greater prominence in her fictional versions of the British Museum and 
the Acropolis in those novels. This focus on the personal experience of 
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the observer (and the curator) leads to recognition of the way in which 
museological experience is also somatic, and in turn prompts a histori-
cization of the museum through the situatedness of one’s place in rela-
tion to it. Woolf therefore extends her reading of exemplification into a 
broader critique of museum culture. She suggests that the epistemological 
question of order and exemplification was at the same time a phenom-
enological question of behaviour: the seemingly intellectual problem of 
classification was also the personal experience of dishevelment.
 The regulation of museum-goers’ behaviour had been a long-held, 
and often explicit, ambition for cultural institutions, for whom any noise 
or affective behaviour could represent a disturbance to its imagined air 
of respectful, silent contemplation. “We learnt to read and see alike in 
the museum,” which dreams of a “total surveillance,” writes Barbara 
Black (35). One model for the museums’ regulation of its visitors was the 
practice of leaving umbrellas at the entrance—attempting to enforce an 
inside/outside distinction that segregated the natural elements from the 
cultural exhibition (implying the timelessness of the preserved artefacts) 
and instilling an air of reverence. Moreover, as many visitors realized, the 
deposited umbrella also embodied a code of personal values that were to 
be left at the door. When Adorno wrote in the 1930s that the selective 
museum visitor “leaves his naiveté outside along with his cane and his 
umbrella” (185) he surely knew that the umbrella had functioned as a 
symbol of codified behaviour in cultural institutions for decades. 
 In his 1858 essay, “Please to Leave Your Umbrella,” Charles Dickens 
had constructed a monologue upon a visit to Hampton Court Palace in 
which he argues with an imaginary interlocutor over why his umbrella 
must always be left at the entrance to public sites such as museums, librar-
ies and churches. Leaving one’s umbrella signifies surrendering “individu-
ality, the true perception of every object on the face of the earth” (485), 
“private judgment,” “individual opinions,” “moral distinctions” (486) and 
“any suspicions I had about me” (487). For Dickens, it represents all that 
is most individual, and therefore most prized, in the possessor: that which 
allows him to bring experience and judgement to the “wearisomely stiff 
and unimaginative forms” of the museum. When Leonard Bast displays 
only a dubious control over his umbrella in Howards End—he loses it at 
a concert before retrieving it at the cost of his honesty—Forster partially 
echoes Dickens’s complaint against the social regulation of culture and 
adds to it his own scepticism about the ability of institutions to direct a 
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worthwhile individual taste. Bast’s umbrella is as useless as his functional 
reading of Ruskin and possibly even harmful. Forster’s character would 
surely fail the entrance examination which Woolf had considered a pos-
sible doorway into the writer’s museum. For Dickens and Forster, the 
umbrella is the codified symbol of a liberalism divided between public 
education, via cultural heritage, and the rights of the individual.
 That Woolf was aware of this code is evident from a brief com-
parison between the delusional expressivity of shoes and the repressive 
socialization of the umbrella in her 1927 essay “Street Haunting.” Here 
the observer-flâneuse marvels at a dwarf woman in a shoe shop. “She got 
up and pirouetted before a glass which reflected the foot only in yellow 
shoes, in fawn shoes, in shoes of lizard skin. . . .Seeing nothing but her 
feet, she imagined perhaps that the rest of her body was of a piece with 
those beautiful feet” (483). Woolf ’s point is that these misleading shoes 
are items of an imaginative encounter. Returning home the flâneuse is 
confronted by the fact that she is a “variegated” self, “all of a mixture.” 
At this point Woolf introduces the umbrella as icon of the repression of 
non-conformist “instincts and desires.” The umbrella is the veneer of the 
“good citizen” who must “put his umbrella in the stand like the rest” 
in a vain attempt to “compel unity” for himself. It is not emblematic of 
that “good citizen” but of the false creation of the image of him. Where 
the shoe offered a (deluded) possibility of knowledge or insight to the 
woman, the umbrella provides repressive (male) control. If Woolf can be 
thought of as an inheritor of the liberal tension between public benefits 
and private taste, her uneasiness is palpably stronger than that of Dickens 
or Forster. In Woolf ’s hands the umbrella is no longer a novelistic tool 
that is indicative of character, as Dickens and Forster had it (Mrs Gamp; 
Bast); for her, the umbrella exemplifies not the individuality of its subject 
but the wrestle for control of cultural space, which was both gendered 
and somatic. 
 In Jacob’s Room, the British Museum and the Acropolis are juxtaposed 
in part by the behaviour of their users, and in particular by their umbrellas. 
Of course, these are very different museum spaces, and that is central to 
Woolf ’s point. As with Forster’s Bast, Miss Marchmont carries a “shabby 
umbrella” (147) which she retrieves on exiting the library prior to view-
ing the so-called Elgin Marbles. This ritual brings people together, having 
been kept apart by the silence of the reading room. “The public collected 
in the hall to receive their umbrellas” and “for the most part” they wait 
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“very patiently”; the process is even personally beneficial since “to stand 
and wait” is “soothing.” The regulation of collective behaviour at the 
British Museum and its reading room works successfully. The comparative 
lack of regulation at the Acropolis stands in contrast to Jacob’s London 
experience, and is one with the general sense of permissiveness he finds 
in Athens. Jacob’s experience at the Acropolis is as much physical as it is 
intellectual: outdoors rather than indoors, of course; the climb, the heat, 
and the light, all influence his observation. He sits to read on “a drum of 
marble conveniently placed . . . in the shade, while the Erechtheum blazed 
white in front of him,” that is, the Erechtheum minus those parts which 
Lord Elgin had taken and eventually sold to the British Government: 
“Greece was over; the Parthenon in ruins” (208). Initially the “ladies with 
green and white umbrellas” are noticed but unobtrusive, yet soon they 
are “opening and shutting their umbrellas just beneath him” (209) and 
interrupting his note-taking. (It would be expected that women would 
carry umbrellas in the Athens heat, but Woolf still notes them and links 
them to intrusiveness.) As Jacob moves across the Erechtheum he is sud-
denly confronted by one of the “ladies” in “tight boots” who “perched 
on a block of marble with a kodak pointed at his head,” prompting his 
silent outburst (“damn these women!”) and a return to his reading. The 
intrusion of the umbrellas signals the almost violent entry of women into 
“culture” and concludes with the frisson of Jacob’s “furtively” looking at 
“the goddess on the left-hand side” who provoked “all sorts of things in 
his head” (210). The disruptive potential of women, signalled via umbrel-
las, is repressed by the silent gaze of propriety at the British Museum but 
interrupts the silent reading of Jacob at the Acropolis. In this way, the 
umbrella can be seen as the object of the observer as the shoes are the 
object of the observed. 
 Woolf ’s accounts of these different museum spaces are reminders that 
they are public and worldly. Two points may be drawn from this. First, 
these spaces underline the point that the museum’s order is contingent 
and transient. The British Museum reading room is a circular body of 
classification containing “the whole collection of human beings” (146); 
in its “conglomeration of knowledge” (147) “each compartment . . . was 
safe and dry” (148). Such apparent order is not evident in Athens, which is 
“the oddest combination, the most incongruous assortment” (204). In this 
mixture of the “suburban” and the “immortal” lies a historical force that 
unsettles appropriation: no amount of rearranging the furniture will re-
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cover a “timeless” past. Second, these spaces are inevitably personal. Woolf 
does not rail against the exclusions perpetrated by “culture” as Dickens or 
Forster might have, or as she would later in A Room of One’s Own (1929), 
because the space has already failed to exclude what is most significant—
the disruptive potential of personal, including bodily, experience. At the 
Acropolis the women’s umbrellas are both ordinary and expected (pre-
cisely not items of exclusion) but also crucially disruptive. Woolf holds 
up the umbrella as part of a comparison of contexts and experiences. The 
umbrella’s role is therefore to underline what was implicit in shoes—that 
museological experience occurs within everyday lives, even in ordinary 
rooms. It is with this point that Woolf historicizes the museum. 
 The experience of the museum comprises a means of historicizing 
it. It may be expected that what is inevitably a site of displacement (rep-
resented most glaringly by the missing Parthenon “marbles”) should lead 
to the estrangement of observers. There is, then, a historical relationship, 
and often a jarring dissonance, between observer and object that produces 
the kind of affected personal displacement Woolf knew too well. This 
may be why objects such as shoes could tantalize only to deceive, their 
work of exemplification inevitably a bathetic disappointment. In her es-
says on house museums, as in her fictions of museums and objects, Woolf 
had drawn attention to the ways in which the physical context of display 
shapes one’s responses. The Carlyle house is “forcibly preserved” (3) so 
that it is “incongruous now, set between respectable family mansions”; 
the generations that followed the Brontës instigated a division between 
path and graveyard that was “a little space between life and death” (7), 
diminishing the permeability of animate and inanimate; revisiting the 
Carlyle house in the 1930s, it seems odd that it lacks “as the house agents 
put it, bath, h. and c., gas fires in the bedrooms, all modern conveniences 
and indoor sanitation” (“Great” 296). In the fictional museums, as well, 
responses are historicized. As with Katharine, whose curatorial routine 
turns her attitude towards the “great men,” it is the historical dissonance 
in one’s relation to the cultural artefact that gives rise to an affective 
response. As Woolf admitted at Haworth, “one hardly feels reverent” (7). 
The account of Jacob’s Cambridge room, with its sudden and unexplained 
switch from past to present tense, is one means by which Woolf could 
signal the historicity of the object, that is, its situatedness in a present that 
attempts to know itself in relation to the past. Jacob’s visit to the Acropolis 
is inevitably accompanied by that symbol of literary tourism, a Baedeker. 
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This emphasis on the mediation of the object by the history of its pres-
ervation and exhibition signals a further difference from the liberalism 
of Forster and Dickens. While they had sought to defend individual taste, 
and circumscribe its limits, against a preaching cultural authority, Woolf ’s 
attention is directed at the intellectual and physical construction of that 
authority.
 Woolf ’s dual focus is on the museum’s epistemological assumptions 
and the experience of the observer. The famous ending of Jacob’s Room 
finds his London house in a state of disorder. “Nothing arranged” la-
ments Bonamy; “Such confusion everywhere!” exclaims Betty Flanders, 
holding out those old shoes. It is surely this setting of the inadequacy of 
exemplification and classification, with a woman handling the exhibit, 
which is the context into which “a pair of Jacob’s old shoes” (246-47) 
should be placed. It was Woolf ’s immersion in the heritage industry that 
triggered this interest in shoes and enabled her to read them as part of 
a museological code. She shows how shoes stood for a reductive sort of 
metonymic exemplification that she resists but which critics have often 
repeated. For Woolf finally reminds us that exemplification is not only an 
epistemological question (or an ontological one, as Agamben concludes) 
but also a historical and personal one. Indeed, it is historical because it is 
personal. In their handling of the shoe exhibits, Betty Flanders and the 
American tourist to Richard Alardyce’s relics, display not only the museo-
logical construction of exemplification but also their own, and our own, 
inevitable implication in the exhibition. I have not used Woolf ’s shoes, 
then, to exemplify a theory of examples or of things, but as guides sug-
gesting that such theories are already historically constructed features of 
the fictions we experience.
Notes
1. For Derrida, the example is not a crutch to understanding but a constitutive 
part of that which it is said to exemplify. In the context of his reading of the 
notion of the frame, and in a reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Derrida 
refers to examples as “prostheses which replace nothing” (79).
2. This phrase is from Woolf ’s story; Brown quotes it (7, 22) having used it 
without quotation marks in each of his first three pages (1, 2, 3).
3. In 1926, E. M. Forster referred to “the pathos of the closing scene” (105), 
and recent critics have developed the idea. Douglas Mao says that the shoes are 
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“relics” (55) and even if they “can never be substitution,” they refer us to the 
dead Jacob. For R. S. Koppen it is the “pairedness” of Jacob’s shoes that makes 
them “represent character” (34). Even where critics have emphasized the shoes’ 
inability to signify anything conclusive, they tend to grasp some hope of pos-
sible redemption. Thus Hermione Lee argues that although Jacob leaves “a 
name, objects, letters, bits and pieces, a pair of old shoes” which are “useless as 
identifiers of personality,” she nonetheless appears to hold out for some tan-
gible reassurance: “What may possibly remain . . . is the imaginative life which 
Jacob was trying to sustain” (89). 
4. Van Gogh’s paintings of “peasant shoes” (35) were for Heidegger “the ex-
ample” of the death of a mode of being. In showing that Heidegger ascribed 
to the shoes a pathos they did not necessarily represent, Derrida found Hei-
degger’s own “pathetic collapse” (262). On the other hand, in post-World War 
Two museum displays of the footwear of holocaust victims, shoes do bear the 
weight of pathos. Perhaps the most viewed exhibit of this kind is the display 
of shoes at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. As Jeffrey David 
Feldman points out, similar displays had long been made in Soviet museums 
(250).
5. Silver argues that these notes formed an important plank in Woolf ’s con-
struction of a theory of reading, which she developed in “How Should One 
Read a Book?” (October 1926) and “Phases of Fiction” (1929).
6. There were versions of “At Home” profiles in, for instance, The World from 
1876 and in Hearth and Home from 1892. I discuss these in my forthcoming 
study of domestic objects and Edwardian and modernist fiction.
7. The letter was to Violet Dickinson from mid-February 1905. Zemgulys ar-
gues that the review of A Literary Pilgrimage shows that Woolf was sympathetic 
to literary tourism. But Thomas’s book is concerned with writers’ country en-
vironments, not with house museums. It is much more a literary reading than a 
tourist exercise. Indeed, Woolf states that “Thomas was as far removed from our 
imaginary pilgrim as well may be” (“Flumina” 161). Her praise for Thomas’s 
book is precisely on the grounds that he does not “pin a poet down” but 
instead allows his interpretation to spin as much from the disconnections be-
tween poets and places. On the other hand, in an earlier review (of The Dickens 
Country by F. G. Kitton) she had vented her dissatisfaction with the simplicities 
of literary tourism: “the books that try to impress upon the mind the fact that 
great men were once alive because they lived in this house or in that are those 
that seem to have least reason for their being” (“Literary” 35).
8. At the time, the museum was located not in the parsonage once inhabited by 
the family but on the rented upper floor of the Yorkshire Penny Bank where it 
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was also home to the Brontë Society. The Society had been formed in 1893 in 
an effort to bring together many of the keepsakes and memorabilia of the fam-
ily which had circulated since the auction of Patrick Brontë’s effects in 1861 
had created a market for Bronteana.
9. For the culturally-conditioned mode of looking that produces the wonder 
of the observer facing the displayed object, see Greenblatt. Thomas Carlyle 
himself wrote much of the wonder that he saw being thoroughly quashed by 
industrial materialism (see “Signs of the Times”). It is clear from the presence 
of the dress that shoes are not a necessary example of the practices of exhibition 
but a possible example: other objects could have functioned in this way.
10. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the number of ethnographic 
artefacts in the British Museum multiplied more than tenfold from 3,700 in 
1851 to 38,000 in 1897. Many of these were permanently displayed, “placed 
hugger-mugger in vastly overcrowded cases.” New acquisitions were simply 
added to the already congested space (Wilson 194).
11. Batchelor says of this paragraph: “It lists his possessions—invitations, a 
photograph of his mother—and books which reflect his view of himself (a 
man of virile tastes)” (67). Wall refers to Jacob’s “emblematic pipe” (317) and 
Robert Kiely says, “the objects in Jacob’s room lend themselves easily to inter-
pretations about the character of the young man who inhabits the space—his 
youth, masculinity, class, intellectual promise, literary taste” (155). Ted Bishop’s 
helpful edition and introduction argues that in the draft “Woolf is using rooms 
as an index of character” (xviii) and that she removes certain rooms (such “A 
Woman’s College”) in order that “Jacob and his room . . . progressively defined 
one another” (xxiii).
12. David Trotter’s tantalising account of this scene echoes (and accepts) 
Woolf ’s blunt analysis of the difference between Edwardians and Georgians. 
Trotter argues that it is “the change of tense” in the final lines that “destroys 
the elaborate Edwardian symptomatology.” He concludes, rightly, that “Noth-
ing in this room expresses” Jacob, only to row back from that conclusion by 
adding “—except a textual ghost” (94), that is, the final lines in present tense. 
My analysis takes issue with his implication that the “symptomatology” of 
objects is present even prior to the shift of tense.
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